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 1. Introduction 
 
We investigate the effect of global and local components of investor sentiment on major stock 
markets, at the level of both the country average and the time series of the cross-section. We also 
consider whether and how sentiment spreads across markets. We find evidence that investor 
sentiment plays a significant role in international market volatility and generates return predictability 
of a form consistent with corrections of overreaction.  
Our quantitative sentiment indices follow six stock markets: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. We construct indices of “total” investor sentiment for 
each country by forming the first principal component of several time series proxies for sentiment. 
We decompose the six total sentiment indices into a single “global” index and six “local” indices. The 
data are annual from 1980 to 2005 and drawn from several international sources. Sentiment is 
intrinsically difficult to measure precisely (and if there was an unambiguous, real-time measure, even 
the mediocre investor would be able to recalibrate himself and in the process reduce or eliminate the 
information content in the measure) so we begin with an index validation test. 
Our validation test is based on dual-listed shares. These so-called Siamese twins are pairs of 
securities that claim equal cash flows but trade in different markets and sometimes at substantially 
different prices. The large price deviations have not been explained in the context of rational markets 
with realistic frictions, let alone frictionless and efficient markets. We document that twins' relative 
prices are positively related to the relative local sentiment indices of their respective markets. This 
provides a relatively clean experiment that supports the empirical validity of our indices. We are not 
aware of other sentiment indices that have been validated by a more convincing method. 
We then ask how sentiment affects international stock markets. The basic supposition is that if 
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sentiment drives prices too far, we may observe corrections in the form of return predictability. We 
start with regressions to predict market returns, pooling six markets together for power in our short 
sample. We find that total sentiment, and particularly the global component of total sentiment, is a 
contrarian predictor of country-level market returns. These results are similar for both value- and 
equal-weighted market returns and for non-U.S. markets. 
Next we examine the effect of sentiment on the time series of cross-sectional returns. Baker 
and Wurgler (2006, 2007) predict that broad waves of sentiment will have greater effects on hard to 
arbitrage and hard to value stocks; these stocks will exhibit high “sentiment beta” (see, e.g., Glushkov 
2005). Confirming this hypothesis, we find that when a country's total sentiment is high, future 
returns are relatively low for its small, high return volatility, growth, and distressed stocks. These 
results are also apparent in the non-U.S. sample. The local component of sentiment affects the 
cross-section considerably more than it does the time series market return. This result is intuitive. 
Many global investors are looking for diversification and simply invest in index funds rather than 
select specific international stocks. In addition, local investors have an overwhelming home bias 
toward their local market, as in, e.g., French and Poterba (1991), and can trade at lower costs than 
international investors. They, and their sentiment, therefore should be expected to have a 
disproportionate effect on the pricing of the cross-section.  
Our final investigation considers whether sentiment is contagious across countries. Given the 
importance of global sentiment in our results, this is an important question. We use the absolute value 
of U.S. capital flows with the other five sample countries to obtain cross-sectional variation in the 
extent of integration between these markets. We find that not only do local and global sentiment 
predict the cross-section of those countries' returns, but so does U.S. sentiment in those countries 
linked with the United States by significant capital flows. This evidence suggests that capital flows 
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are a key mechanism through which global sentiment develops and propagates, but there are surely 
others, including word-of-mouth and the media. 
Our study contributes to a growing literature studying the role of investor sentiment. In 
addition to the papers above, Brown and Cliff (2004), Lemmon and Portnaiguina (2006), Qiu and 
Welch (2004), and other papers have found evidence for a role of investor sentiment in U.S. stock 
market returns. Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Shiraishi, and Watanabe (2005) study U.S. and Japanese 
flows into bull and bear funds. Yu and Yuan (2011) argue that the tradeoff between risk and expected 
return applies only in low sentiment periods; Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2011) argue that sentiment’s 
predictive power is concentrated in high-sentiment periods and in stocks in short legs. Baker and 
Wurgler (2011) investigate how sentiment connects the cross-section of stock returns and government 
bonds, while Bekaert, Baele, and Inghelbrecht (2010) discuss sentiment and the time-series 
relationships between government bond and stock market returns. Papers arguing that sentiment 
affects aggregate financing patterns include Baker and Wurgler (2000), Henderson, Jegadeesh, and 
Weisbach (2006), and Kim and Weisbach (2008). 
To summarize, we make several contributions to this literature. First, this paper is the first to 
investigate the role of sentiment within and across international equity markets. We construct usable 
indices of total, global, and country-specific sentiment for six markets. Second, we conduct a 
validation exercise with Siamese twins; most of the sentiment literature is unable to provide any 
validation exercise. Third, we study the effects of sentiment at the index level, where we find 
significant predictability relationships, perhaps because the panel of countries provides more power 
than a single U.S. time series. Fourth, we provide the first extensive study of the international 
time-series of the cross-section of stock returns, and in particular we find that the U.S. results by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) translate to other markets. Fifth, we provide some initial evidence about 
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how global sentiment develops and propagates. 
Section 2 explains the method of construction of the sentiment indices. Section 3 describes the 
validation test. Section 4 uses sentiment to predict the time series of market returns, and Section 5 
considers the time series of the cross-section of returns. Section 6 investigates sentiment contagion. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Total, global, and local sentiment indices 
2.1. Basic approach 
 
Our method for estimating international markets’ sentiment builds on Baker and Wurgler's 
(2006) strategy for U.S. sentiment. We employ a number of sentiment proxies that we hypothesize 
contain some component of investor sentiment and some component of non-sentiment-related 
idiosyncratic variation. To remove the latter we first orthogonalize the raw sentiment proxies to a 
variety of macro series. Each market’s “total” sentiment is then estimated as the first principal 
component of those orthogonalized sentiment proxies. A single “global” sentiment series is then 
estimated as the first principal component of these total sentiment series. Finally, each market’s 
“local” sentiment is estimated as the residual of its total sentiment regressed on global sentiment. 
 
2.2. Sentiment proxies: motivation and data 
 
We are constrained by the availability of international sentiment proxies and cannot employ 
all those that the predominantly U.S. investor sentiment literature has examined. We also elect to use 
the same four proxies for all six international markets, as much as possible, although an argument 
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could be made that the principal components methodology outlined above should be able to tolerate 
different proxies for different markets.  
The first proxy is a quantity that we refer to as the volatility premium and simply identifies 
times when valuations on high idiosyncratic volatility stocks are high or low relative to valuations on 
low idiosyncratic volatility stocks. This is by analogy to Baker and Wurgler's (2004) use of the U.S. 
dividend premium, which as the relative valuation of dividend- and non-dividend-paying stocks is 
highly related (inversely) to the U.S. volatility premium.1  
The motivation for this variable derives from the theoretical prediction that sentiment has its 
strongest effects on hard to value and hard to arbitrage stocks. Obviously, all else equal, these are 
stocks that noise traders can plausibly defend extreme values for, as befits their current optimism or 
pessimism. One example is Koski, Rice, and Tarhouni (2009) who show that volatility attracts day 
traders. More generally, the proportion of individual ownership is increasing in volatility (Sias 
(1996)).2  
Somewhat less obviously, volatile stocks are, all else equal, also particularly unattractive to 
arbitrageurs, which in turn redoubles the potential for those stocks to be affected by noise trader 
sentiment. Volatile stocks are inherently riskier to trade—volatility brings with it fundamental and 
arbitrage risk, as in Pontiff (1996) and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), and they are associated with 
noise trader risk, as just mentioned. Volatile stocks also tend to be costlier to trade. Bid-ask spreads 
are wider due to the probability of informed trading (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)) and higher 
inventory costs (Ho and Stoll (1980)). Price impact beyond spreads is larger (Chan and Lakonishok 
                                                
1We cannot form the dividend premium in some markets because dividends are relatively uncommon and, in some 
countries, dividends do not appear to be viewed by local investors as connoting “stability” in the way they historically 
have for U.S. investors. 
2We will later describe, and control for, a non-sentiment association between valuations and volatility based on Pastor and 
Veronesi (2003). 
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(1997)). Short-sales costs are higher because upward price movements generate more frequent margin 
calls (Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) and Bali, Scherbina, and Tang (2011)) and because the 
rebate rate is higher (Diether (2008)), which may reflect the fact that the supply of borrowed shares is 
influenced by institutional ownership, which is negatively correlated with volatility (Sias (1996)).  
The volatility premium (!"#$) is the yearend log of the ratio of the value-weighted average 
market-to-book ratio of high volatility stocks to that of low volatility stocks. High (low) volatility 
denotes one of the top (bottom) three deciles of the variance of the previous year's monthly returns, 
where decile breakpoints are determined country by country.3 Total volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the trailing 12 months of monthly returns, and to control for any association 
with beta and a confusion with priced risks, we compute the volatility premium based only on 
beta-adjusted idiosyncratic volatility (for simplicity, however, we will continue to rever to this 
variable as the volatility premium). This variable was available for all years and all countries. On 
average in our sample, the market-to-book ratio of high volatility stocks has been higher than that of 
low volatility stocks, but in each country this relationship has been reversed within our time period.  
The second and third proxies we employ are derived from initial public offering (IPO) data. 
They are the total volume of IPOs and their initial, first-day returns (sometimes called underpricing). 
The theoretical motivation for using the volume of IPOs is simply that insiders and long-run 
shareholders have strong incentives to time the equity market for when valuations are greatest, which 
is presumably when sentiment is highest. Low long-run returns to IPOs have been noted by Stigler 
(1964), Ritter (1991), and Loughran, Ritter, and Rydkvist (1994), which is ex post evidence of 
successful market timing relative to a market index. But issuers need not care that much whether their 
firm’s misvaluation is due to firm-specific or marketwide factors; consistent with that notion, equity 
                                                
3 We follow Fama and French (1993), who use top 3 deciles and bottom 3 deciles for factor construction.   
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issues as a fraction of total new issues forecast low market returns as well (Baker and Wurgler 
(2000)). The worst future returns occur for IPOs and equity issues from “hot market” cohorts with 
high total issuance volume. 
It has been widely noted that the initial returns on IPOs increase in hot markets. In in the 
United States in 1999, for example, there were 477 IPOs and the average raw first-day return was 
70%. And in Japan that year, the average first-day return was 137%! It is implausible that these 
figures reflect just adverse selection premiums, for example. If anything, the anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the issues with the highest first-day returns were in the greatest demand. Ritter (1998) 
sums up our motivation for these two sentiment proxies: “rational explanations for hot markets are 
difficult to come by” (p. 10). 
The number of IPOs (!"#$) is the log of the total number of IPOs that year. The initial 
returns on IPOs (!"#$) are the average initial (most often, first-day) return on that year's offerings. 
The returns are equal-weighted across firms. The data were obtained from a variety of sources. We 
were able to find both variables for the full sample with the exception of France for 1980 through 
1982 and Germany for 2003 through 2005. In the United States, the annual number of IPOs has 
ranged from 64 to 953 in the sample period, and the average first-day return on IPOs has ranged from 
around 7% to a high of 70% (exponentiate the Min and Max values from Table 2), as noted above. 
Most other countries have also seen high variation in these quantities.4 
The fourth sentiment proxy is market turnover. Commentators on speculative episodes such as 
Bagehot (1873) and Kindleberger (1978) have noted that high trading volume in the overpriced asset 
is a pattern that goes back to the tulip bubble. Cochrane (2002) states that “the association of price 
                                                
4An important question is whether IPO market measures have the same meaning in bank-oriented countries (in our 
sample, France, Germany, and Japan) as they do in market-oriented countries. The survey of international IPO market 
studies in Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) does not indicate any obvious differences in dimensions of particular 
interest, including mean IPO underpricing; the relationships between IPO volume, market returns, and future GNP 
growth; and mean abnormal returns on IPOs.  
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and volume is a generic feature of the historical ‘bubbles’” (p. 17). Lamont and Thaler (2003) 
examine tech stock carve-outs and find that the relatively-overpriced IPO subsidiaries have an 
average turnover rate of 38% per day over the first 20 days of trading (not including the first day), 
which is more than five times that of parent turnover. There was much greater volume in Internet 
relative to non-Internet stocks between 1998 and 2000 (Ofek and Richardson (2003)). In a cleaner 
test, Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2009) find a correlation between trading and price differentials in 
fundamentally identical Chinese A-B shares. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) find 
experimental evidence that bubbles are associated with high turnover. Subsequent research indicates 
that this correlation is robust to the introduction of trading fees, short-sales constraints, and the use of 
business professionals as test subjects. 
There is also ample theory to connect sentiment and trading volume. Any greater-fool theory 
of rational bubbles (Harrison and Kreps (1978)) or models of positive feedback trading by informed 
investors essentially requires that those who believe the asset is overvalued be able to trade it away 
before the mispricing corrects (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b)). Uninformed 
fund managers can churn bubbles to confuse their clients into thinking they are informed (Allen and 
Gorton (1993)). Baker and Stein (2004) point out that when shorting is relatively costly, sentimental 
investors are more likely to trade when they are optimistic, and overall volume goes up. Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003) provide a complementary argument based on overconfidence for using turnover as 
a proxy for sentiment. So, as with the other three measures, we expect a positive relationship between 
the observed proxy and underlying sentiment. 
Market turnover (!"#$) is the log of total market turnover, i.e. total dollar volume over the 
year divided by total capitalization at the end of the prior year. We detrend this with an up-to-five 
year moving average. We could obtain market-level turnover statistics for all markets but Germany. 
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We detrend because all markets except Japan display a positive trend in turnover.5  
Overall, we used roughly a dozen primary data sources to construct these proxies. They are 
listed in Table 1 and summary statistics are given by country in Table 2.  
Finally, to remove information about expected returns that may be contained in our sentiment 
proxies that is not related to sentiment, we follow Baker and Wurgler (2006) and orthogonalize each 
proxy to six macro series. These are consumption growth (Breeden (1979)), from the Penn World 
Tables, and industrial production growth (Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986)), inflation (Fama and Schwert 
(1977), Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986)), employment growth (Santos and Veronesi (2006)), the 
short-term rate (Fama and Schwert (1977)), and the term premium (Keim and Stambaugh (1986), 
Fama and French (1989)), from the OECD.  
The macro series turn out to explain comparatively little of the variation in the sentiment 
proxies. Consequently, the correlation between the orthogonalized and raw proxies is, on average 
across the four proxies, 0.88. It is comforting that macro series that contain a great deal of 
contemporaneous and forward-looking information about economic fundamentals are, even in 
combination, so unrelated to our proxies. Admittedly, however, it is impossible to rule out that an 
as-yet undiscovered risk factor drives all of the various relationships between the sentiment proxies 
and expected returns that we find later.  
 
2.3. Total sentiment indices 
 
The total sentiment index coefficients for each country are reported in the loadings column of 
                                                
5For Canada, France, and the United States, the data are obtained from a single source. For Japan and the United 
Kingdom, the data from two different sources were combined to provide long series from 1980 to 2005. To make the 
series from different sources consistent, we multiply the later series by constants to render it to have the same standard 
deviations with the early series in the overlapping periods. 
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Table 2. The index coefficients are estimated using the first principal component of each of the 
macro-orthogonalized sentiment proxies. The resulting indices are linear functions of the 
within-country standardized values of the proxies and thus have mean zero: !"#$!"#"$"!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (1) !"#$!"#$%&!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!!!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (2) !"#$!"#$%&'!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (3) !"#$!"#"$!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (4) !"#$!"!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (5) !"#$!"!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$! ! !!!"!"#$!, (6) 
where the country subscripts on the proxies have been suppressed.6 The fraction of variance 
explained by the first principal components are, in order of the countries listed above, 38%, 40%, 
48%, 37%, 37%, and 42%, and in each country there is at least one eigenvalue that exceeds unity. 
These figures resemble the 49% reported in Baker and Wurgler (2006) for a six-factor index of U.S. 
sentiment.   
We standardize the total sentiment indices and plot them in Figure 1. A prominent feature is 
the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and its subsequent crash; this is clearly represented not only in 
the United States but in at least three other countries. These results serve as a reminder that 
Germany's Neuer Markt, France's Nouveau Marche, and London's TECHMark--only the last of which 
still exists--were overseas cousins of the more familiar Nasdaq in both composition and 
performance.7 
                                                
6French IPO data for 1980-1982 and Germany IPO data for 2003-2005 were not available. For each country we fit their 
total sentiment indices to the other other five countries’ indices in the period of overlap, and then used the predicted value 
to fill the missing data points.  
7Other examples include the Italian Nuovo Mercato, the Nordic New Market, and approximately ten other European 
markets that opened between 1996 and 2001. 
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A feature that we will return to when we discuss empirical hypotheses is mean-reversion of 
the sentiment indices. For now we just mention the facts. The first-order autocorrelations of changes 
in the indices are -0.423 (Canada), -0.163 (France), 0.092 (Germany), -0.373 (Japan), -0.287 (UK), 
and -0.138 (US). The second-order autocorrelations of changes are 0.036 (Canada), 0.028 (France), 
-0.222 (Germany), 0.034 (Japan), -0.311 (UK), and -0.219 (US). Thus, only changes in Germany’s 
index have a positive first-order autocorrelation, and this is ultimately outweighed by its larger 
negative second-order autocorrelation. This feature of the German index is suggested in a close look 
at Figure 1: whereas a few other countries experienced one-year sentiment spikes around the Internet 
bubble, German sentiment, as measured by our indices, stayed at a peak for one or two years more.  
 
2.4. Global and local sentiment indices 
 
We separate the total sentiment indices into one global and six local components. The global 
index is the first principal component of the six total indices. The loadings are reported in Table 3 as  !"#$!!"#$%" ! !!!!"!"#$!"#"$"!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$!"#$%&!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$!"#$%&'!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$!"#"$!!!"#$%   
 !!!!"!"#$!"!!!"#$% ! !!!"!"#$!"!!!"#$%. (7) 
The United States is widely considered the world's bellwether market. Consistent with this position, 
the United States’ total sentiment index exhibits a high degree of commonality with other countries' 
indices and receives the highest loading in the global index. 
The standardized version of the global index is plotted in Fig. 2. Not surprisingly, Fig. 2 
indicates that global sentiment rose steadily through the mid-1990s, peaked in 1999 and 2000, and 
then dropped by a few standard deviations within three years. Before entering the Internet bubble, 
global sentiment had declined from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. 
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Local indices are defined as the components of the total indices orthogonal to the global 
index. That is, we regress the total sentiment indices on the global index in each country and define 
local indices as the residuals. We standardize these and plot them in Fig. 2. 
Qualitative interpretations of the indices involve a large degree of conjecture as well as an 
understanding of historical market conditions. Proper interpretation of the local indices, in particular, 
require a grasp of both global and market conditions, as well as some caution given the unavoidable 
noise in the estimates. With these qualifications in mind, one can speculate on some of the variation 
in the U.S. local index. The index reaches high levels in the early 1980s, perhaps reflecting 
speculative activity in biotech and natural resources shares that was concentrated in the United States. 
The index declines somewhat following the 1987 crash, but not dramatically, reflecting the fact that 
the crash was a global phenomenon (Roll (1988)).  
Perhaps because the technological advances of the Internet were concentrated in the United 
States, the local index suggests that the sentiment associated with the bubble may have materialized 
there (and in Canada) first. Interestingly, while the U.S. total sentiment was high at the bubble’s peak, 
it was not uniquely high relative to other countries in the sample. However, U.S.-specific sentiment 
did decline to an unusual degree with the crash, most likely reflecting the combination of the crash 
and the terrorist attackson September 11, 2001. 
 
3. Validation with Siamese twins 
3.1. The Siamese twins 
 
The existing investor sentiment literature rarely provides any external validation test for its 
proxies. In this paper we attempt to do somewhat better, because an experiment exists in the 
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international context that does not exist in the U.S. context. Specifically, we connect our sentiment 
indices to the international violations of the law of one price observed in dual-listed companies. 
Dual-listed companies, often termed “Siamese twins,” are literally textbook violations of arbitrage 
[see, e.g., Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2008)].  
More background will help to motivate this validation exercise. A twin pair comprises two 
companies which are incorporated in different countries and whose shares trade locally in those 
countries but, frequently as a result of a merger, have contractually agreed to operate their business as 
one and divide its cash flows to shareholders in a fixed ratio. There are around a dozen such company 
pairs as of the time of this writing, but the pair of Royal Dutch (traded mainly in the United States 
and the Netherlands) and Shell Transport (traded mainly in the United Kingdom) is still the 
best-known example, despite their recent unification.  
For Royal Dutch-Shell pair, as determined by a 1907 alliance, all cash flows, adjusting for 
corporate tax considerations and control rights, are split in the proportion 60:40. However, as 
documented by Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and De Jong, Rosenthal, and 
Van Dijk (2009), the Siamese twins, among the largest and most liquid securities in the world, trade 
at prices that differ from the fixed cash flow ratio, and often by considerable amounts. For example in 
our sample period, deviations from parity of more than 50 cents on the dollar—from -35% to 
+17%—are observed. De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk (2009) report that such deviations are 
observed in all Siamese twin pairs to a greater or lesser degree.  
Froot and Dabora provide a comprehensive examination of structural reasons why these price 
gaps may occur. They consider six explanations in depth: “discretionary uses of dividend income by 
parent companies; differences in parent expenditures; voting rights issues; currency fluctuations; 
ex-dividend-date timing issues; and tax-induced investor heterogeneity. Only that latter hypothesis 
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can explain some (but not all) of the facts.” Shleifer (2000) further points out that any fixed structural 
or differences-in-risk explanation would have trouble explaining how the deviation from parity 
changes sign over time: “there is no story in which the cash flows of one stock are subjected to a 
different fundamental risk than the cash flows of the other” (p. 31).8 He and others conclude that the 
deviation exists and persists because arbitrageurs fear noise trader risk, i.e. the risk that noise trader 
sentiment drives the mispricing to get worse before it gets better.9,10  
With our putative sentiment measures we are able to examine this explanation more directly. 
To the extent that it is borne out in the data, it supports the joint hypothesis that our sentiment indices 
are valid and that the drivers of the Siamese twins' price gaps include differential investor sentiment. 
Note that this joint hypothesis is the principal limitation of this exercise. It could be true that the twins 
discount does not reflect relative sentiment, but some other unidentified economic force that is 
driving both the discount and our indices. This resembles the standard joint hypothesis problem that 
arises in tests of market efficiency: to test market efficiency one must take a stand on the market’s 
model of expected returns (Fama (1970)). But in the case of the Siamese twins this argument has 
considerably less force. As Shleifer (2000) points out, given the unique features of the experiment, 
“the Fama [1970] critique is irrelevant” (p. 31). 
                                                
8Shleifer and Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2008) also point out that this as a cleaner demonstration of the violation of the 
law of one price than the closed-end fund discount, which does involve management fees and other structural features. 
9Lowenstein (2000) reports that Long Term Capital Management bet $2.3 billion on Royal Dutch-Shell alone, illustrating 
that it was viewed as a mispricing by sophisticated investors, and lost almost $200 million on the trade, illustrating noise 
trader risk. See De Jong, Rosenthal, and Van Dijk (2009) for a detailed examination of the risks and return of dual-listed 
company arbitrage. 
10In July 9, 2002, Royal Dutch was removed from the S&P 500 Index along with several other non-U.S. firms. What was 
a Royal Dutch premium became a discount in a matter of days, as index funds and benchmark sensitive investors sold 
Royal Dutch over this period. Royal Dutch dropped by 25% between the announcement and the effective date. Shell fell 
too, as arbitrage maintained relative prices, but only by 17%. Both prices rebounded in the following weeks, but the 
deviation in prices did not revert to its previous level. Unilever, operating in a very different sector, had the same pattern 
of returns in its twin shares. This case study illustrates that the Siamese twin deviations capture index level differences in 
nonfundamental demand. While this particular demand shock had nothing to do with country-level sentiment, it proves 
the point that country-level relative demand for broad baskets of stocks would be apparent in Siamese twin deviations.    
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In summary, after more than 20 years of research on the Siamese twins, we could find no 
paper that finds or even asserts the existence of such a hidden explanation. Those who do advance 
specific explanations generally assert that noise trader risk is what allows the deviation to exist and 
persist. As such, the validation test would seem informative. At the very least, it provides a better test 
than any yet presented in the sentiment literature. 
 
3.2. Data and results 
 
We obtain the relative prices of Siamese twin pairs from 1981 through 2002 from Mathias 
Van Dijk (http://mathijsavandijk.com/dual-listed-companies). Three pairs of twins have both 
companies in our sample markets and provide 51 annual observations. They all involve the United 
States and United Kingdom. Fig. 1 indicates that our sentiment measures in these countries are highly 
correlated, which reduces the power of the test and thus the ability to document a connection with the 
Siamese twins.11 
The sentiment indices include both changes or return-like components, such as first-day 
returns on IPOs and perhaps detrended turnover, and level components, like the volatility premium. 
We therefore compare them to both changes in and levels of twin relative prices. We use annual 
observations on the yearend log price ratio, scaled such that a value of zero represents theoretical 
parity, and compare the changes and levels to the prevailing difference between U.S. sentiment and 
U.K. sentiment. The specifications are:  !!"!!!! ! ! ! ! !"#!!"!!! ! !!"!!"!!! ! !!!!!"!!!!!! ! !!!! (8) 
                                                
11Royal Dutch (U.S.) and Shell Transport (U.K.) from 1981 through 2002; Smithkline Beecham H shares (U.S.) and 
Smithkline Beecham E shares (U.K.) from 1990 through 1996; and Unilever NV (U.S.) and Unilever PLC (U.K.) from 
1981 through 2002. 
 17 
and  !"!!!! ! ! ! ! !"#!!"!!! ! !"#!!"!!! ! !!!!"!!!!!! ! !!!! (9) 
where i denotes one of the three twin pairs. We use the asterisk superscript because we test both total 
and local sentiment indexes. We control for the lagged relative price level because it is empirically 
quite persistent; because the sentiment indices are not measured without error; and because both 
sentiment indices have been standardized, removing any differences in means or scales. The change 
in the deviation is not very persistent, so its inclusion in the first specification is not material. 
Table 4 indicates that the relative level of investor sentiment has a significant relationship to 
the relative level and changes of twins' prices. Given the sample size and low power of this test, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is surprisingly statistically significant and economically important. The 
standard deviation of the change of the log price ratio is 9.38%, while the standard deviation of the 
total sentiment gap is 0.992, so a one-standard deviation change in the latter is associated with a 
change in the log price ratio swift of !!!"#!!!!!" ! !!!"#, or approximately half of a standard 
deviation. Note that we report two-sided p-values, based on clustered standard errors, by convention, 
although our hypothesis is one-sided. We has also conducted Stambaugh (1986) corrections and 
added control variables with little statistical or economic change in the results.  
The results provide some extra support that a sentiment interpretation of our indices is 
reasonable. To repeat, we aknowledge that this interpretation is conditional on this test having largely 
resolved the joint hypothesis problem. If, as Shleifer (2000) and others argue, that is the case, then in 
addition to supporting the indices, the results also provide further evidence that they are right that 
noise trader sentiment-driven mispricing helps to explain why the Siamese twins deviate so far from 
parity. With a joint hypothesis, it is all or nothing. We conclude that the exercise does, at a minimum, 
provide a more compelling validation test for a sentiment index than any in the literature. 
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4. Sentiment and market-level returns 
 
4.1. Prior evidence, hypotheses, and market-level data 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) provide an anecdotal history of investor sentiment in the United 
States since the early 1960s. They note the electronics boom in the early 1960s, the growth stocks 
boom in the late 1960s, the Nifty Fifty preference of the early 1970s, various industry-specific 
bubbles through the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, and the Internet bubble. We shall not attempt 
to catalog other (asserted) stock market bubbles and sentiment-driven variation for each of our 
non-U.S. markets, although this is a worthy task. 
The empirical literature has employed sentiment-type measures as contrarian market-level 
return predictors only sporadically and mainly in the U.S. context. Kothari and Shanken (1997) 
discuss the predictability of the aggregate book-to-market ratio for annual U.S. market returns. They 
propose a sentiment-type explanation based on evidence of predictably negative risk premiums, 
which is inconsistent with market efficiency since rational risk premiums must be positive. Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) adopt this approach using the equity share in total equity and debt issues and find 
results consistent with Kothari and Shanken; they, too, find periods of predictably negative market 
returns. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) extend this evidence to financing patterns 
international markets. Baker and Wurgler (2007) find some evidence that an index similar to that 
estimated here predicts market-level U.S. returns, while Brown and Cliff (2004) do not find evidence 
of predictability. 
The general impression from the time-series predictability literature, not just that involving 
sentiment, is that there are few if any variables that strongly reject the null of no predictability. Our 
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panel of six countries has more power to reject the null of no market return predictability than returns 
from the United States alone (Ang and Bekaert (2007)), although due to cross-correlation this 
amounts to fewer than six independent observations per period.  
Motivated by the prior sentiment literature using U.S. data, we hypothesize that our sentiment 
indices are contrarian predictors of international index-level returns. As in the cross-sectional 
literature that derives predictability implications from cross-sectional limits to arbitrage, contrarian 
predictability at the market level can arise from at least two mechanisms. One is that arbitrageurs are 
essentially sidelined in extreme periods by noise trader risk (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990a), Shleifer and Vishny (1997))—the variability of investor sentiment—and prices 
correct when noise traders’ own beliefs correct, perhaps because the noise traders are confronted by 
realizations of economic fundamentals.  
A second mechanism behind predictability is that noise traders’ beliefs and hence mispricing 
stabilize at an extreme level, perhaps because they are fully invested, at which arbitrageurs find the 
expected returns so great that they outweigh the noise trader risk. They, too, wait for the facts to 
materialize, and as this happens in the expected direction, which it does on average if the arbitrageurs 
are correct, they are willing to become more and more heavily invested, pushing the aggregate 
demand curve and restoring fundamental value. 
It is not easy to distinguish between these mechanisms, and we do not attempt to do so here. 
Earlier we showed that our total sentiment series exhibited mean reversion over the horizon of one or 
two years. This is consistent with an explanation for predictability involving reversion in noise trader 
beliefs. Regarding the reason for this change, Baker and Wurgler (2006), where sentiment indices 
predict the time-series of the cross-section of earnings announcement returns—high sentiment 
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forecasts lower earnings announcement returns on hard to value and hard to arbitrage stocks.12 This 
is consistent with an information-based mechanism, but it cannot determine the extent to which this 
information is changing noise trader beliefs or confirming to arbitrageurs that they can be more 
aggressive. 
We collect monthly market return data from Datastream, which cover the stocks from the 
largest exchange in each country except in the United States. For the United States, it covers the 
union of the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq. We gather both value-weighted and equal-weighted indices; 
the difference in predictive effects between these will foreshadow the results in the time-series of the 
cross-section to come later.  
 
4.2. Predicting market returns 
 
We pool monthly returns from 1981 to 2006 for our countries and regress the monthly market 
returns for country c in year t its beginning-of-year investor sentiment index value (i.e. the value 
prevailing as of the end of the previous year, which we shall call t-1 in an abuse of monthly and 
yearly notation):  !!"#!!!! ! ! ! !"#$!!!!!!!"#$% ! !!!!,  (10) 
and !!"#!!!! ! ! ! !"#$!!!!!"#$%" ! !"#$!!!!!!!"#$% ! !!!!. (11) 
Because of the cross-correlation in returns, our significance tests use month-clustered standard errors. 
Table 5 indicates that total investor sentiment serves as a statistically significant contrarian 
                                                
12We do not attempt this test here because of the low quality of international earnings announcement dates data.  
 21 
predictor of market returns across these six markets.13 The economic significance of the effect is 
nontrivial. All sentiment indices are standardized, so a one-standard-deviation increase in a country's 
total investor sentiment index is associated with 3.5 percentage points per year (29 basis points per 
month) lower value-weighted market returns and 4.3 percentage points (36 basis points per month) 
lower equal-weighted returns. The stronger equal-weighted results presumably reflect smaller stocks 
being harder to value (due to spottier information and less certain prospects) and to arbitrage (due to 
generally greater costs and risks). This logic is developed a bit further in the next section, which 
focuses solely on cross-sectional tests.  
Interestingly, the country-level results are mainly driven by global sentiment. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in the global sentiment index is associated with 5.4 percentage points 
per year (45 basis points per month) lower value-weighted market returns and 5.6 percentage points 
(47 basis points per month) lower equal-weighted market returns. This conclusion also does not 
depend on including the United States in the sample, and it raises the important issue of cross-country 
sentiment contagion. We consider this below. For now, Table 5 represents new evidence that 
sentiment affects markets around the world, not just in the United States where it has been most 
extensively studied. 
We performed but do not report a number of additional robustness tests for the results in 
Table 5 that were prompted by referee suggestions. None of the following had a major effect on these 
results: excluding Germany, for which we are missing a few years of sentiment data; controlling for 
the lagged dividend yield [see, e.g., Shiller (1984), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French 
(1988), and others] and the short-term interest rate (Fama and Schwert (1977)); excluding turnover 
from the sentiment proxy set; excluding the idiosyncratic volatility premium from the proxy set; 
                                                
13Once again, we report two-sided p-values per convention, though the sign of all theoretical predictions in the paper is 
unambiguous and thus the statistical hypotheses are in fact one-sided. 
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using a total volatility premium rather than an idiosyncratic volatility premium; using an idiosyncratic 
volatility premium where idiosyncratic volatility is first orthogonalized to firm age, to control for a 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003) effect in which valuations depend on uncertainty about firm profitability 
that changes over time.   
Finally, in unreported results we tested whether the U.S.-U.K. Siamese twin premium predicts 
relative market returns on those two markets, consistent with the presumption of our validation 
approach that it reflects sentiment. We find that a one standard deviation higher deviation from twin 
parity predicts a -7.2% relative equal-weighted market return (Newey-West two-sided p-value of 
0.07) and a -4.0% relative value-weighted return (Newey-West two-sided p-value of 0.12) in the 
coming year. The economic magnitude is nontrivial and the statistical significance is not 
unimpressive given the 22-year sample period and single time series.  
 
5. Sentiment and cross-section of returns 
5.1. Prior evidence, hypotheses, and firm-level data 
 
The literature on predicting the time series of the cross section of expected stock returns is 
fairly small and uses only U.S. data, often with a focus on investor sentiment. Brown and Cliff 
(2004), and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), and most extensively Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
investigate the ability of sentiment to explain the time series of the cross section. Brown and Cliff 
(2004) find little connection using their sentiment measures, and Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) 
find stronger evidence of sentiment as a contrarian predictor of small stocks and low institutional 
ownership stocks but not value or momentum portfolios. Qiu and Welch (2007) also use sentiment to 
predict small stocks. Also, from a non-sentiment perspective, Ghosh and Constantinides (2011) 
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develop a predictor based on economic regimes.  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) find robust predictability of the time series of the cross-section 
using a U.S. index similar to that used here. Their stronger results may indicate more informative 
sentiment proxies and/or sharper cross-sectional predictions. In particular, they observe that sentiment 
should have relatively stronger effects on stocks that are hard to arbitrage—those that arbitrageurs 
find relatively costly or risky to trade against mispricings. For a recent survey of the theoretical 
literature on limits to arbitrage, see Gromb and Vayanos (2010); a large empirical literature 
documents cross-sectional variation in frictions such as short-selling costs, transaction costs and 
asymmetric information, arbitrage risk, and noise-trader risk. These frictions lead certain stocks' 
aggregate demand curves to be more downward sloping and thus their prices more sensitive to 
sentiment-driven demand shifts. Second and perhaps more novel, Baker and Wurgler (2006) observe 
that sentiment should have relatively stronger effects on stocks that are hard or highly subjective to 
value properly. Both extremely high or low valuations on such stocks can be plausibly defended by 
sentimental investors, as befits their current sentiment. 
The basic empirical prediction of all this is that sentiment may serve as a contrarian predictor 
of “high sentiment beta” portfolios. Again, as discussed above, contrarian predictability can arise 
from corrections in noise traders’ own beliefs, consistent with the negative autocorrelations of 
changes in the sentiment indices, or eventual pressure from arbitrageurs, who become more 
aggressive as earnings realizations confirm mispricing. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that sentiment 
indices predict the time-series of the cross-section of U.S. earnings announcement returns, consistent 
with an information-based mechanism. 
Conveniently, several key stock portfolios are classifiable as either relatively easy to arbitrage 
and easy to value or as relatively hard to arbitrage and hard to value, making this prediction 
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straightforward to test.14 Examples of stock portfolios with high sentiment beta characteristics are 
small, high volatility, non-dividend paying, unprofitable, distressed, or extreme growth portfolios; 
their complement portfolios are lower, perhaps even negative sentiment beta. 
An interesting subtlety is how to capture growth and distress characteristics using value or 
sales growth portfolios. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that the effects of sentiment on these 
portfolios are roughly U-shaped. Very high book-to-market or very low (negative) sales growth can 
be associated with distress; very low book-to-market can be associated with extreme growth, as is 
very high sales growth. In other words, when sorting stocks along value or sales growth dimensions, 
high sentiment beta stocks commonly reside in the extreme high and low deciles where staid, low 
sentiment beta stocks are typically found in the middle. We account for this U-shape in our tests.15 
Our cross-sectional portfolios are formed based on four firm or stock characteristics that are 
easy to gather for each market: firm size, total risk, book-to-market equity ratio, and sales growth. 
Returns and market capitalization are from Datastream. Book equity values (item WC05476) and 
annual sales (item WC05508) are from Worldscope. We exclude observations with negative book 
equity. Total risk is the volatility of monthly total returns over the prior year. Decile breakpoints vary 
by country-year. Returns are equal-weighted within each decile portfolio.  
 
5.2. Predicting the time series of the cross-section 
 
Simple two-way sorts are presented in Table 6. We sort stocks across years according to 
whether the level of their total sentiment index is positive or negative. The basic predictions are borne 
                                                
14Notably, momentum does not fall clearly in either set. 
15Not accounting for this nonmonotonicity in sentiment beta may explain why some prior research found no clear 
connection between sentiment and value portfolios. 
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out. The top volatility decile stocks earn 134 basis points per month lower returns when the year 
starts in a high-sentiment state, consistent with a correction of sentiment-driven overpricing. This 
return difference cumulates to 16.1 percentage points over the year. High sentiment periods also 
portend one hundred basis points per month lower returns on the smallest capitalization portfolio, 
another large effect. As hypothesized, the effect of sentiment is much smaller on low volatility stocks 
or large stocks, their being relatively easy to arbitrage and value. 
As mentioned above, we predict a somewhat U-shaped effect of sentiment on book-to-market 
and sales growth portfolios. This is borne out to a greater extent in the sales growth than the 
book-to-market portfolios. In the sales growth portfolios, the bottom decile earns 69 less basis points 
per month coming out of high sentiment periods, and the top decile earns 107 basis points less, 
whereas the differences in the middle deciles (12 and 18 basis points in portfolios five and six) are 
typically smaller. Cumulated over the year, the differences between the extreme and middle deciles 
are meaningful, though not as strong as the volatility and capitalization results. In unreported results, 
we exclude the United States and the results are similar. 
Next we move to time series regressions to predict long-short portfolios. This provides a 
simpler setting in which to conduct hypothesis tests and also allows us to look at the separate effects 
of global and local sentiment. The basic regression models are:  !!!"!!"#$!!!! ! !!!"!!!!"#!!!! ! ! ! !"#$!!!!!!!"#$% ! !!!!, (12) 
and !!!"!!"#$!!!! ! !!!"!!!!"#!!!! ! ! ! !"#$!!!!!"#$%" ! !"#$!!!!!!!"#$% ! !!!!. (13) 
Again the significance tests incorporate month-clustered standard errors. 
The total sentiment column in Table 7 is highly consistent with the results from the sorts. In 
five out of six hypothesis tests, the effect of total sentiment is statistically significant with the 
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expected sign. The remaining long-short portfolio, which sorts on distress by using high value against 
medium value, is of the expected negative sign. The economic significance of the effects implied here 
is naturally similar to that from the sorts, with the effects for the volatility portfolios again being 
largest. Sorting on volatility leads to particularly clear contrasts on both arbitrage risk and valuation 
ambiguity dimensions. Excluding the United States leads to similar results. 
The influence of local sentiment is much more prominent in the cross-section. With the 
exception of the volatility portfolios, where global sentiment remains three times as important as local 
sentiment, local and global sentiment are roughly equally important. Also, local sentiment tends to be 
more statistically significant in specifications where global sentiment is not, at least in part because it 
includes cross-sectional variation. 
The greater effect of local sentiment on the cross-sectional results is intuitive. Global 
investors have less information on individual companies and face higher transaction costs. Many 
global investors are simply looking for diversification, and this is available at lowest cost through a 
market-tracking investment such as an index fund or Exchange-Traded Fund. More in a sentiment 
vein, local investors are more likely to act on rumors or develop unusual beliefs about specific local 
stocks. They also have a comparative trading cost advantage. All this, and given the very strong home 
bias (French and Poterba (1991)), leads to the prediction that local sentiment will have greater effects 
in the local cross-section.   
We conducted but do not report various robustness exercises for the results in Tables 6 and 7. 
We find that controlling for the Fama and French (1993) factors tends to attenuate statistical 
significance but the qualitative results are similar. In a sense, this is not really a robustness test, 
because some attenuation is predicted under our hypotheses: for example, controlling for small and 
medium enterprises (SMBs) or market return minus risk-free return (Rm-Rf) amounts to controlling 
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for effects that we predict and document in Tables 5 and 7, and reduces the variation in sentiment that 
is orthogonal to the independent variables. We also repeat exercises that we performed to investigate 
the robustness of the market-level preditability patterns: excluding Germany; excluding turnover from 
the sentiment proxy set; excluding the idiosyncratic volatility premium from the proxy set; using a 
total volatility premium rather than an idiosyncratic volatility premium; using an idiosyncratic 
volatility premium where idiosyncratic volatility is first orthogonalized to firm age. None of these 
variants made a noteworthy difference to the results.  
 
6. Sentiment contagion 
 
Our results suggest that both global and local sentiment affect stock prices. When global and 
local sentiment are high, future local stock returns are low, and particularly so for stocks predicted to 
have high sentiment betas. The local sentiment effects extend the evidence from the United States on 
sentiment and the cross section of stock returns. The effect of global sentiment suggests a more novel 
mechanism: sentiment may be contagious. 
There are two sources of contagion. One possibility is that investors in one country are 
optimistic (for example) about investment prospects in another and bid up the shares of that particular 
country. Using our measures, this will be captured by local sentiment. Local sentiment rises with the 
local volatility premium, the local number of IPOs, the local first day return on IPOs, and the local 
rate of share turnover. These are local measures, but they reflect capital market activity, which in 
principle can come from foreign as well as local investors. The evidence in Klibanoff, Lamont, and 
Wizman (1998) and Hwang (2011), who examine the pricing of closed-end funds, are suggestive of 
this channel. 
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Another possibility is that investors in one country, say, e.g., the United States, are simply 
optimistic and this leads to a shift into risky assets more broadly, including international equities. 
United States sentiment will then affect prices in another target country, above and beyond local 
sentiment, provided that our measure of local sentiment is not absolutely complete, as it surely is not, 
and provided that there is a robust flow of private capital from the United States into the target. 
To be specific, what we care about is the round-trip flow of capital, both from the United 
States to another country in our sample and back to the United States. Countries with high absolute 
flows, we hypothesize, will be subject to sentiment propagation. High U.S. sentiment will predict 
negative future returns to a greater extent if capital flows from the United States are high. Low U.S. 
sentiment will predict positive future returns to a greater extent if capital flows back to the United 
States are high. This pattern suggests using the interaction of the absolute value of flows with 
sentiment to predict future returns. 
We test this hypothesis in Table 8. We regress future returns of long-short portfolios formed 
on size, volatility, growth, and distress in the five countries excluding the United States on lagged 
sentiment in the local country, as before. But we now include U.S. sentiment, and more interestingly, 
U.S. sentiment interacted with capital flows from the United States to each of the five other countries.  !!!"!!!"!!!!! ! !!!"!!"#!!!! ! ! ! !"#$!!!!!!!"#$% ! !"#$!!"!!!!!"#$% ! !!!"#!!"!!!!!!!  
 !!"#$!!"!!!!!"#$% !!!"#!!"!!!!!!!! !!!!. (14) 
 
The data on capital flows come from the Treasury Bulletin and are normalized by the market 
value of the foreign stock market. In every case where the effect of sentiment of the local country is 
statistically significant, there is also a strong and conditional effect of U.S. sentiment. Provided the 
capital flows between the United States and Canada, to take an example, are high in absolute value, 
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then U.S. sentiment has the same effect on hard to value and to arbitrage Canadian stocks as 
Canadian sentiment. The results are consistent with private capital flows being a mechanism that 
spreads sentiment across markets. 
There are, of course, other mechanisms to spread sentiment. One is social influence, i.e., word 
of mouth sharing of positive investment experiences. Shiller (1984) discusses this mechanism, and 
Hirshleifer (2009) models how the bias toward sharing positive information leads to the spread of 
investing particularly in volatile, hard to value stocks. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2011) show that high 
stock returns of local peers in Finland encourage additional stock market participation. Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein (2004) find that mutual fund managers in the same city exhibit common trading patterns. 
Brown, Ivkovic, Smith and Weisbenner (2008) find that stock market participation depends on that of 
neighbors. Strictly speaking, this evidence pertains to the spread of sentiment within a geographic 
area. The effects tail off with the distance between actors. 
Technology and mass-media can reduce the effects of distance and represents another distinct 
mechanism by which sentiment can spread, potentially across borders, in the absence of direct 
investment. Shiller (1984) discusses this as well. Tetlock (2007) shows a causal effect of business 
news on stock returns, for instance, and Antweiler and Frank (2004) try to connect them to the 
conversations of Internet chat rooms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We summarize by reviewing the main contributions of the paper. The first is to construct 
practical indices of investor sentiment for six major stock markets and global markets as a whole; 
prior literature and available sentiment indices focus on the United States. Specifically, we construct 
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sentiment indices for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
and from these total sentiment indices we extract one global and six local, or country-specific, 
indices. Second, we connect these indices to Siamese twins share prices, providing a degree of 
external validation that the existing sentiment literature does not.  
The third and fourth contributions of the paper are to document that investor sentiment affects 
the time series of international market-level returns as well as the time series of the cross-section of 
international stock returns. We find that global sentiment is a statistically and economically 
significant contrarian predictor of market returns. Both global and local components of sentiment 
help to predict the time series of the cross-section; namely, they predict the returns on high 
sentiment-beta portfolios such as those including high volatility stocks or stocks of small, distressed, 
and growth companies. Our paper appears to be the first to study the international time series of the 
cross-section of stock returns, and the results indicate that the U.S. results of Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) extend to the international context. All of these results are directionally consistent with 
theoretical predictions.  
Our fifth contribution is to investigate how global sentiment emerges and propagates. We find 
evidence that it emerges at least in part because sentiment is contagious across markets, and at least 
one of the mechanisms at play is international capital flows. Ours is a simple investigation of the 
contagion question; there is considerable scope for further research on investor sentiment within and 
across international markets.
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Figure 1: Total Investor Sentiment, 1980 to 2005
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Total investor sentiment, SENT Totalc , is the first principal component of four time series
proxies for sentiment for the given country. The first proxy (PV OL) is the log ratio of
the equal-weighted average market-to-book ratios of stocks with high idiosyncratic volatil-
ity (top three deciles) and stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility (bottom three deciles).
The second proxy (NIPO) is the log number of initial public oﬀerings over the year. The
third proxy (RIPO) is the average first-day returns of initial public oﬀerings in the year.
The fourth proxy (TURN) is detrended log turnover over the year. Prior to forming the
first principal component, the proxies are orthogonalized with the respect to consumption
growth, industry production growth, employment growth, the short-term interest rate, in-
flation, and the term premium.
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Figure 2: Global and Local Investor Sentiment, 1980 to 2005
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Local
Global sentiment (SENTGlobal) is the first principal component of the total sentiment
indices (SENT Totalc ) in the six countries. Local sentiment (SENTLocalc ) is the residual
from the regression: SENT Totalc = bc SENTGlobal + SENTLocalc , for each country.
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Table 4: Time Series Regressions for Siamese Twins
Panel A Deviation Change
∆devi,t = a+ b(SENT ∗US,t − SENT ∗UK,t) + c ∆devi,t−1 + ui,t
N Constant SENTdiff ∆devt−1 R2
×102
Total Sentiment 48 0.01 4.43 -0.21 36%
[.36] [.00] [.17]
Local Sentiment 48 0.01 2.42 -0.11 29%
[.54] [.00] [.44]
Panel B Deviation Level
devi,t = a+ b(SENT ∗US,t − SENT ∗UK,t) + c devi,t−1 + ui,t
N Constant SENTdiff devt−1 R2
×102
Total Sentiment 51 0.01 2.40 0.82 74%
[.35] [.02] [.00]
Local Sentiment 51 0.01 1.29 0.81 72%
[.40] [.09] [.00]
The dependent variable is the change or level of the annual log deviation of the relative
price of three pairs of Siamese twins trading in the U.S. and the U.K. between 1981 and
2002. The independent variables are the diﬀerence between total (or local) sentiment.
Clustered p–values are in braces.
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Table 5: Time Series Regressions for Country-Level Index Returns, 1981 to 2006
SENT Totalc,t−1 SENT
Global
t−1 SENT
Local
c,t−1
d p(d) R2 e p(e) f p(f) R2
Panel A. Including U.S.
VW -0.29 [.08] 0.3% -0.45 [.05] 0.03 [.68] 0.7%
EW -0.36 [.04] 0.4% -0.47 [.05] -0.07 [.48] 0.8%
Panel B. Excluding U.S.
VW -0.27 [.10] 0.2% -0.44 [.06] 0.01 [.91] 0.6%
EW -0.33 [.05] 0.4% -0.45 [.05] -0.06 [.57] 0.7%
RMKT,c,t = a+ dSENT
Total
c,t−1 + uc,t (1)
RMKT,c,t = b+ eSENT
Global
t−1 + fSENT
Local
c,t−1 + uc,t (2)
Regressions of monthly country-level value- and equal-weighted index returns on pre-
vious yearend SENT Totalc (in equation (1)), or on previous yearend SENT
Global and
previous yearend SENTLocalc (in equation (2)). In Panel A, the sample includes
monthly country-level index returns from 1981 to 2006 in six countries. In Panel B,
the sample excludes U.S. data. The first column shows the results from equation
(1), and the second and third columns show the results from equation (2). Clustered
p–values are in braces.
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Table 7: Time Series Regressions for Cross-Sectional Returns, 1981 to 2006
SENTTotalc,t−1 SENTGlobalt−1 SENTLocalc,t−1
d p(d) R2 e p(e) f p(f) R2
Panel A. Size and Risk
σ High-Low -0.73 [.00] 1.8% -0.82 [.00] -0.27 [.08] 2.4%
ME SMB -0.24 [.05] 0.2% -0.21 [.04] -0.17 [.30] 0.3%
Panel B. Growth Opportunities
BE/ME Low-Medium -0.32 [.00] 0.9% -0.23 [.03] -0.20 [.00] 0.8%
GS High-Medium -0.40 [.00] 1.7% -0.29 [.03] -0.25 [.03] 1.5%
Panel C. Distress
BE/ME High-Medium -0.03 [.80] 0.0% -0.09 [.52] 0.03 [.64] 0.1%
GS Low-Medium -0.20 [.03] 0.5% -0.13 [.15] -0.15 [.09] 0.5%
Panel D. Size and Risk, excluding U.S.
σ High-Low -0.65 [.00] 1.5% -0.76 [.00] -0.25 [.12] 2.3%
ME SMB -0.22 [.04] 0.2% -0.23 [.05] -0.12 [.52] 0.3%
Panel E. Growth Opportunities, excluding U.S.
BE/ME Low-Medium -0.28 [.00] 0.7% -0.16 [.13] -0.23 [.00] 0.7%
GS High-Medium -0.37 [.01] 1.5% -0.22 [.17] -0.28 [.01] 1.4%
Panel F. Distress, excluding U.S.
BE/ME High-Medium 0.01 [.89] 0.0% -0.07 [.58] 0.07 [.24] 0.1%
GS Low-Medium -0.17 [.05] 0.5% -0.08 [.35] -0.16 [.04] 0.5%
RXit=long,c,t −RXit=short,c,t = a+ dSENTTotalc,t−1 + uc,t (1)
RXit=long,c,t −RXit=short,c,t = b+ eSENTGlobalt−1 + fSENTLocalc,t−1 + uc,t (2)
Regressions of long-short equal-weighted portfolio returns on previous yearend SENTTotal (in equation (1)), or on
previous yearend SENTGlobal and previous yearend SENTLocal (in equation (2)). The first column shows the results
from equation (1), and the second and third columns show the results from equation (2). The sample includes monthly
country-level portfolio returns from 1981 to 2006 in the six countries. The long-short portfolios are formed based on
firm characteristics (X): firm size (ME), total risk (σ), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), and sale growth (GS). High
includes the top two deciles; low includes the bottom two deciles; medium includes the middle two deciles. Clustered
p–values are in braces.
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Table 8: Time Series Regressions for Sentiment Contagion, 1981 to 2006
Constant SENTTotalc,t−1 SENTTotalUS,t−1 |F lowUS↔c,t−1| SENTTotalUS,t−1× R2
|FlowUS↔c,t−1|
Panel A. Size and Risk
σ High-Low -0.38 -0.41 -0.07 0.60 -0.45 3.6%
[.31] [.03] [.86] [.01] [.02]
ME SMB 0.23 -0.20 0.24 0.58 -0.40 1.6%
[.37] [.30] [.24] [.01] [.01]
Panel B. Growth Opportunity
BE/ME Low-Medium 0.01 -0.30 0.29 0.11 -0.18 0.8%
[.95] [.01] [.07] [.34] [.12]
GS High-Medium 0.25 -0.29 0.11 -0.01 -0.13 1.5%
[.29] [.07] [.49] [.81] [.09]
Panel C. Distress
BE/ME High-Medium 0.11 0.05 -0.20 0.17 0.03 0.6%
[.52] [.62] [.32] [.08] [.76]
GS Low-Medium -0.21 -0.14 0.29 -0.02 -0.19 0.9%
[.11] [.11] [.01] [.80] [.00]
RXit=long,c,t −RXit=short,c,t = a+ bSENTTotalc,t−1 + cSENTTotalUS,t−1 + d|FlowUS↔c,t−1|
+eSENTTotalUS,t−1 × |FlowUS↔c,t−1| + ut
The dependent variable is the long-short equal-weighted portfolio return from five countries: Canada, France, Ger-
many, Japan, and the U.K. |FlowUS↔c,t−1| is the absolute value of the normalized capital flow between U.S. and
the other five countries. It is normalized by the market value of the foreign stock market. The long-short portfolios
are formed based on firm characteristics (X): firm size (ME), total risk (σ), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), and sale
growth (GS). High includes the top two deciles; low includes the bottom two deciles; medium includes the middle two
deciles. Clustered p–values are in braces.
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